Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Before the Supreme Court was whether an action for separate maintenance and support could be pursued when the parties were still living together. Eileen (Wife) and Clifford (Husband) Theisen were married in 1980. At the time of this action, the parties owned three properties: the marital home, which was in Wife's name, and two rental properties, both of which were in Husband's name. Wife had filed for divorce on two previous occasions, at least one of which was premised on the fault ground of physical cruelty. Wife filed this action for separate maintenance alleging Husband "has engaged and continue[ed] to engage in a course of conduct making it unreasonable and unfair to require [Wife] to continue to live with him." Husband counterclaimed for equitable distribution of the marital assets and debts as well as attorney's fees. Husband further made motions to dismiss Wife's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Both of Husband's motions were premised on the fact that Husband and Wife were not living separate and apart. He also moved to cancel the lis pendens placed on his rental properties. The court found it "ha[d] the jurisdiction to order separate support and maintenance, [but it did] not have the authority to do so when the parties [were] living together." Accordingly, the court dismissed her complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed the family court because Wife failed to allege that she and Husband were living separate and apart at the time of filing. Furthermore, because Wife's lis pendens and claim for attorney's fees hinged on the validity of her complaint, the Court found no error in the family court's denial of that relief. View "Theisen v. Theisen" on Justia Law

Thomas Skinner received an award of benefits from the Workers' Compensation Commission for asbestosis under the scheduled loss provisions of Section 42-9-30 of the South Carolina Code.  Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Skinner's former employer, appealed that decision, arguing Skinner could not recover for a scheduled loss and must proceed under the "general disability" statutes found in Sections 42-9-10 and 42-9-20 of the South Carolina Code. Westinghouse's arguments on appeal concerned the impact of section 42-11-60 on Skinner's right to recover for his pulmonary disease.  In particular, it argued Skinner could only recover for total or partial disability under sections 42-9-10 and 42-9-20, respectively.  The Supreme Court agreed with Westinghouse and reversed the special referee's affirmation of Skinner's award based upon the clear language of section 42-11-60: "[i]n that section, the General Assembly specified that recovery for a pulmonary disease such as Skinner's hinges upon a showing of lost wages under section 42-9-10 and 42-9-20.  Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive of the appeal, it is not necessary for us to address the remaining issues raised by the parties." View "Skinner v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." on Justia Law

In 2004, Sherry Ray formed CFRE, a single-member limited liability company with herself as the sole member. CFRE conducts no business and was formed solely for estate planning and asset protection purposes. To that end, Ray declined to have CFRE taxed as a corporation and, in 2006, deeded the title in her home to it. Because there was a conveyance by deed of the property, the Greenville County Assessor automatically commenced a reassessment of the property for the 2007 tax year. Accordingly, the property was subjected to the default property tax ratio of six percent until CFRE could prove entitlement to the lower ratio under section 12-43-220. When CFRE sought the four percent ratio, the Assessor denied it eligibility. CFRE, LLC appealed the decision of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that held that real estate owned by the company was not entitled to the residential tax ratio. Furthermore, CFRE argued the ALC erred in not sanctioning the Assessor for failing to respond to discovery requests from CFRE. While the Supreme Court held the ALC did not abuse its discretion in not sanctioning the Assessor, the Court reversed the ALC's conclusion regarding CFRE's entitlement to the legal residence tax ratio and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CFRE v. Greenville County Assesor" on Justia Law

This case invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. Plaintiff Board of Trustees of the School District of Fairfield County (Board), Defendants State of South Carolina and the Legislative Delegation of Fairfield County (collectively, the State), and Defendant-Intervenors House of Representatives and the Senate (collectively, the General Assembly), jointly petitioned the Court to determine the constitutionality of Act 308 of the South Carolina Acts of 2010 (Act 308). The Board raised two challenges to the constitutionality of Act 308: (1) the Board asserted the General Assembly did not override the Governor’s veto of Act 308 in accordance with Article IV, section 21 of the South Carolina Constitution; (2) the Board asserted Act 308 is impermissible special legislation in violation of Article III, section 34 of the South Carolina Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the General Assembly did not override the Governor's veto of Act 308 in accordance with the State constitution. The Court entered judgment in favor of the Board. View "Fairfield School District v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant Foreign Academic & Cultural Exchange Services, Inc. (FACES) instituted this action against Respondent Daniela Tripon for breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, and injunctive relief. FACES recruits teachers from outside the United States and places them with schools within the state pursuant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Program. Respondent, a Romanian citizen, contracted with FACES to participate in its program, and entered the United States on a J-1 visa. Pursuant to the "foreign residency requirement" of the J-1 visa, respondent was required to return to her home country and remain there for at least two years following departure from the United States. After Respondent had taught for two years, she and FACES entered into a revised agreement for the term of an additional school year. The new contract also increased respondent's salary and contained an acknowledgement that respondent would return home for two years after the contract expired. Shortly after executing the new contract, respondent married a former FACES teacher, and was granted a waiver of the J-1 foreign residency requirement, allowing her to remain in the United States. Subsequently, Respondent accepted a full-time position with another school district and received an H-1B visa allowing her to remain in the United States after the expiration of her J-1 visa. Following respondent's failure to return to Romania as contracted, FACES instituted this action. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent as to all of FACES' claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment, finding there were material questions of fact whether respondent breached the revised contract by not returning to her home country and accepting another job, whether FACES suffered any actual as opposed to liquidated damages, and whether respondent breached the duty of loyalty implied in every employment contract. View "Foreign Academic & Cultural Exchange Services, Inc. v. Tripon" on Justia Law

Appellant Stivers Automotive of Lexington, Inc. (Stivers) and Respondent South Carolina Federal Credit Union (SCFCU) were parties to a Dealer Agreement (Agreement), under which SCFCU agreed to purchase sales contracts between Stivers and purchasers of its vehicles. Among other provisions in the Agreement, Stivers warranted certain representations made in connection to its sales contracts assigned to SCFCU. Hiram Riley (Riley) sought to purchase a vehicle from Stivers but was unable to qualify for financing. Stivers' salesman, Tom Roper (Roper), indicated that Riley could get the car if he found a co-signer. Riley contacted his sister, Mildred Higgins (Higgins), who agreed to co-sign for the car. Roper then visited Higgins at her home to sign the appropriate paperwork. After Roper thoroughly explained the documents, Higgins indicated she understood and signed the paperwork. As it turned out, the paperwork was drafted so that Higgins was the sole purchaser of the car, not a co-signer. Ultimately, SCFCU approved the loan to Higgins for the purchase price. Riley picked up the vehicle, with the understanding that he was to make the payments. Riley eventually stopped making payments on the car, stopped driving it, and told SCFCU where it could recover the car. SCFCU hired an agent to repossess the vehicle. SCFCU filed a complaint against Higgins, given that her name was on the loan. Higgins denied the allegations in the complaint, stating that she was incompetent at the time of the execution of the contract. Subsequently, SCFCU amended its complaint, alleging Stivers breached the Agreement. The trial court granted SCFCU's motion for a directed verdict against Stivers, finding Higgins lacked capacity to contract and Stivers breached the Agreement in that regard. The court also held that Stivers breached all contract warranties. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by directing a verdict against Stivers on the issue of capacity. Additionally, the Court held that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict to SCFCU as to the other warranties contained in the contract, as well as the amount of damages due SCFCU. View "South Carolina Federal Credit Union v. Higgins" on Justia Law

Petitioner Gary DuBose Terry was sentenced to death for murder, life imprisonment for first-degree burglary, thirty years' imprisonment for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and ten years' imprisonment for malicious injury to a telephone system. Petitioner argued in his application for post-conviction relief (PCR) that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to argue during the hearing on the State's in limine motion that certain statements should have been introduced because of the State's misconduct and trial counsels' detrimental reliance on the State's "apparent intent" to offer those statements into evidence. Furthermore, Petitioner contended trial counsel were ineffective in failing to adjust their defense strategy in the guilt phase of trial in order to maintain credibility with the jury during sentencing. Specifically, petitioner argued trial counsel had a duty, after stating during the opening statement that petitioner "confessed," to adjust their trial strategy and not continue to pursue a reasonable doubt defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support the PCR court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s application, and affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Terry v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant Theresa Clea filed suit to recover for personal injuries sustained by her son (Trevon) after he was bitten by Respondent Essix Shannon's dog. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment as to Appellant's strict liability and common law negligence claims. However, the Court found the circuit court properly granted summary judgment as to appellant's attractive nuisance claim. Accordingly, Court affirmed part, and reversed part of the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Clea v. Odom" on Justia Law

This case was a direct appeal in a workers' compensation matter from a master's order reversing the Full Commission and finding respondent's decedent was totally disabled as the result of an occupational disease. On appeal, Appellant W. L. Gore & Associates contended this matter should have been dismissed because Respondent's admittedly untimely appeal to the Commission deprived the Commission of jurisdiction. Upon review of the Commission's record, the Supreme Court agreed that the untimely appeal to the Commission required it to vacate both the master's order and the decision of the Full Commission. View "Allison v. W. L. Gore" on Justia Law

Appellant/Respondent Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company ("Harleysville") issued a series of standard CGL policies to the Respondent developers or their predecessors (collectively "Crossmann") for a series of condominium projects in the Myrtle Beach area of South Carolina. The exterior components of the condominium projects were negligently constructed, which resulted in water penetration and progressive damage to otherwise nondefective components of the projects. The homeowners settled their lawsuits against Respondents. Crossmann then filed this declaratory judgment action to determine coverage under Harleysville's policies. Upon review of the lower court’s order, the Supreme Court reversed a finding of joint and several liability against the developers and its insurer, and found the scope of Harleysville's liability was limited to damages accrued during its "time on the risk." In so ruling, the Court adhered to its holding in “Joe Harden Builders, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.”: “[u]sing our ‘time on risk’ framework, the allocation of the damage award against Crossmann must conform to the actual distribution of property damage across the progressive damage period. Where proof of the actual property damage distribution is not available, the allocation formula adopted herein will serve as an appropriate default method for dividing the loss among Crossmann's insurers.’ The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further consideration of the "time on risk" allocation. View "Crossmann Communities v. Harleysville Mutual" on Justia Law