Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In May 2002, Respondent Eagle Windows & Doors, Inc.’s predecessor purchased Eagle & Taylor Company’s assets (Eagle I) from Eagle I's bankruptcy estate. In 2000, homeowners constructed a residence using defective windows manufactured by Eagle I. In 2006, homeowners settled their construction claims against the Appellant contractor. The contractor and its insurer (Appellants) then brought this contribution suit against Respondent as successor to Eagle I. The circuit court granted respondent's motion to dismiss, holding (1) dismissal was required under Rule 12(b)(6) because a bankruptcy order expressly precluded any state law successor liability actions since the sale was "free and clear" under 11 U.S.C. 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code; and (2) that dismissal was proper under Rule 12(b)(1) of the state rules of civil procedure because the bankruptcy court in Ohio which issued the Eagle I order retained jurisdiction over any claims against respondent for successor liability. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellants' claim did not arise under either the settlement agreement or the order, nor did their claim relate to Eagle I. Rather, it was predicated upon Respondent's post-sale conduct which, Appellants contended, exposed it to successor liability under South Carolina state law. The Supreme Court concluded the court erred in dismissing this suit, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nationwide Mutual v. Eagle Windows" on Justia Law

Appellant-Respondent Tykat, Inc. appealed an Administrative Law Court's (ALC) decision that upheld Clarendon County's tax assessment on real property Tykat leased from the South Carolina Public Service Authority.  Tykat contended the leased property was exempt from tax because the South Carolina Public Service Authority is constitutionally exempt from paying taxes and because Tykat's use of the property may be classified as a public purpose.  Clarendon County (through its Assessor) cross-appealed the Administrative Law Court's denial of its request for attorneys' fees and costs. Upon review of the lower court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the ALC.  Based on the limited challenge raised by Tykat, its leasehold interest was subject to ad valorem taxation under the plain language of section 12-37-950 of the South Carolina Code (2000):  "[t]hus, [the Court was] bound to apply the statute as written." Furthermore, the Court affirmed the denial of Clarendon County's request for attorneys' fees and costs. View "Clarendon County v. TYKAT" on Justia Law

In response to population growth and business development along U.S. Highway 278 in Beaufort County, the South Carolina Department of Transportation ("the Department") engaged experts for the purpose of streamlining the flow of traffic on that highway. The properties on the north side of Highway 278 agreed among themselves to share the cost of modifying and/or building private roads that would allow left turn access to all of their properties by way of the new median crossover.  The properties on the south side of the highway, however, were unable to reach such an agreement.  As a result, Appellant Hilton Head Automotive's (HHA) property—which is on the south side of the highway—lost its immediate left turn access to and from Highway 278.  Nonetheless, HHA retained direct right turn access to and from the eastbound lanes of Highway 278. HHA argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Department's reconfiguration of the median crossovers on U.S. Highway 278 was a taking because it deprived Appellant and its customers of the ability to enter or exit the highway by making a left turn.  Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the Department of Transportation. View "Hilton Head Automotive, LLC v. So. Carolina Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Petitioner Roy Tennant challenged the trial court's rulings on several evidentiary issues in his trial for first degree kidnapping, and assault and battery.  In particular, Petitioner argued the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a forensic psychologist, erred in excluding a note written by Petitioner addressed to the victim, and erred in excluding proffered statements regarding the sexual history between the victim and the defendant. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to uphold the trial court, finding that Petitioner's proffered evidence was irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, and therefore, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the trial court's exclusion. View "South Carolina v. Tennant" on Justia Law

Employee-Petitioner Melenia Trotter was awarded workers' compensation benefits for a back injury by the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission").  Petitioner worked at "the turb and trim station," which consisted of using an "air driver" (a screwdriver with a blade) to trim down tubes to the same length, and then "turbulating" the tubes by putting a spring into each tube. According to Petitioner, she began having spasms and some lower back pain that extended down her legs in December 2004, which she mentioned to her Team Leader and Trane's Safety Coordinator.  Petitioner continued to work with increasing discomfort in December 2004 and January 2005. An MRI revealed Petitioner had a herniated disc at L5-S1 with marked compression of the right S1 nerve root.  Following a doctor's recommendation, Petitioner underwent surgery in early 2005. In May 2005, Petitioner filed a claim alleging a job-related injury to her back. Trane denied the claim, maintaining it did not receive notice of the injury until after her surgery and that there was insufficient proof of a work-related injury. An Appellate Panel of the Commission unanimously upheld the commissioner's order finding Petitioner's injury was work related and granted her benefits.  The circuit court affirmed.  Trane appealed, and the appellate court reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in finding the Commission abused its discretion in denying Trane's motions for a continuance or to keep the record open for depositions to be taken.  Consequently, the Court reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the order of the Commission.  View "Trotter v. Trane Coil Facility" on Justia Law

Respondent Municipal Court Judge Sheryl Polk McKinney's sister, who was the Clerk of the Town of Varnville, was arrested and charged with embezzlement of public funds, forgery, and misconduct in office.  Respondent's sister was accused of issuing checks in Respondent's name, forging respondent's name to the checks and converting the money for her personal use over an eight year period. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that by her misconduct, Respondent violated multiple Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Rule 501, SCACR). The Court found Respondent’s misconduct warranted a suspension from judicial duties.  Respondent was suspended for thirty days.  View "In the Matter of Municipal Court Judge Sheryl Polk McKinney" on Justia Law

Appellant Matthew Kundinger received a default judgment against Louis and Linda Frazer (the Frazers) before the Frazers closed a refinance mortgage with Matrix Financial Services Corporation (Matrix).  In Matrix's foreclosure action, the master-in-equity granted Matrix equitable subrogation, giving the refinance mortgage priority over Appellant's judgment lien. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging his judgment had priority over Matrix's mortgage because it had been recorded first.  Matrix, attempting to gain the primary priority position, then sought to have the refinance mortgage equitably subrogated to the rights of its January 2001 mortgage.  The master-in-equity granted Matrix's request, and Appellant appealed that order. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that a lender that refinances its own debt is not entitled to equitable subrogation.  The Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Matrix Financial Services Corp. v. Frazer" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brian DiMarco sought a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision that affirmed, as modified, a family court's contempt order against him.  Petitioner was subject to a court order to make monthly child support payments to Cheryl DiMarco (Mother).  According to Petitioner, he had made child support payments for over ten years before Mother filed for an increase in 2006.  The family court instead decreased the support order and ordered the payments be made through the court beginning on April 1, 2008.  Petitioner asserts he timely attempted to make the first payment to the court, but the court lacked record of the order and could not accept the payment. In May 2008, the clerk of the family court filed a Rule to Show Cause because Petitioner was behind on his child support payments. The hearing was scheduled for June 25, 2008. On June 23, 2008, Petitioner paid the arrearage, bringing his child support account to a zero balance. On the morning of June 25, Petitioner did not appear on time for the Rule to Show Cause hearing. The judge issued a warrant for Petitioner's arrest.  No testimony was taken on whether or not Petitioner had failed to pay child support.  Shortly thereafter, Petitioner arrived at the courthouse.  During the hearing, everyone who spoke noted Petitioner did not owe any outstanding child support at that time. During his argument, Mother's attorney stated, "I think the court needs to very much impress upon him taking the law into his own hands and not showing up, not being here on time it's just, just it's driving everyone nuts." From the bench the judge held Petitioner in civil contempt, suspended confinement and a levied a fine. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals because the sanction ordered by the family court violated Petitioner's rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court of appeals said "the family court's contempt sanction has elements of both civil and criminal contempt."  The civil element of the sanction, the court found, was that the incarceration would not be imposed unless Petitioner failed to pay the $250.00 to the court.  The criminal element was that if Petitioner failed to pay the $250.00, he would be incarcerated for a definite period of time.  To remedy the family court's unclear sanction, the court of appeals modified the order and held Petitioner must pay the $250.00 in court costs, and if he failed to do so by the deadline established, then he would be incarcerated for twelve months.  In doing so, the court of appeals crafted a sanction that violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. View "DiMarco v. DiMarco" on Justia Law

Petitioner Glenda Barron began working for Respondent Labor Finders of South Carolina in Respondent's Charleston office around 1990.  During petitioner's employment, Respondent planned to open a second office location in the Charleston area and informed Petitioner she would be promoted to regional sales manager for both Charleston locations.  In 2004, petitioner signed an agreement acknowledging her status as an at-will employee and setting her compensation as "straight commission" of 3% of customer payments deposited and posted by both Charleston offices each week, to be paid within ninety days of the invoice date. The second Charleston office opened in September 2004 and began earning income that November.  In January of the following year, Petitioner became concerned that respondent had not paid her the full amount of commissions she had earned. The supervisor contacted respondent's owner, who acknowledged that, due to an oversight, he forgot to pay Petitioner the commissions from the new Charleston location.  Petitioner never filed a written complaint with the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, as outlined by the Payment of Wages Act (Act). Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment the next day, stating it was forced to downsize in light of recent budget cuts.  Eight or nine days later, Respondent issued Petitioner a check in excess of the amount she was owed for commissions. Petitioner sued, alleging violations of the Act, breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.  The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent as to all causes of action. Petitioner appealed the entry of summary judgment as to her wrongful termination claim.  The Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner argued on appeal that the Court of Appeals erred in holding she could not maintain a wrongful termination claim under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.  While the Supreme Court agreed the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis, the Court nonetheless affirmed the decision: "[a]lthough we agree. . . that there is no statutory remedy within the Act that would preclude an employee from maintaining a wrongful termination action, we nevertheless decline to address whether the public policy exception applies when an employee is terminated in retaliation for filing a wage complaint with the Department of Labor.  We find the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment because there is simply no evidence the Act was ever implicated."  Petitioner never filed a complaint with the Department of Labor as required by the Act, nor did she ever indicate to respondent she had filed or intended to file a complaint.  "Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to petitioner, there is no genuine issue of material fact whether petitioner was terminated in retaliation for availing herself of the protections of the Act." View "Barron v. Labor Finders" on Justia Law

Appellant Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hospital (the Hospital) was a defendant at trial in the underlying civil case.  On the morning of the trial, Appellants removed the case to federal court for the second time on the same grounds as the initial removal.  The federal district court judge again remanded the case to state court.  The state trial judge, imposed severe sanctions against the Appellants for the delay created by the second removal.  Appellants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that they should not have been sanctioned for the second removal because it was done in good faith. The Supreme Court agreed with both [the trial judge's] version of the facts and his conclusion that the second removal was not based on good grounds and was interposed solely for delay: "[w]hile Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety.  We find such is the case here." The Court affirmed the lower court's imposition of sanctions. View "Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hospital v. Wieters" on Justia Law