Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carolina Chloride, Inc. sued Richland County alleging the County incorrectly advised it of the legal zoning classification of its property and that it lost a potential sale of the property due to the zoning issue.  The trial judge directed a verdict for the County on all of Carolina Chloride's claims.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded as to the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation but upheld the directed verdict as to Carolina Chloride's remaining claims. On appeal, the County argued the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the directed verdict in its favor on Carolina Chloride's claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a]lthough it is certainly unfortunate that a mistake occurred in this case, Carolina Chloride had no legal right to rely solely upon the representations of County personnel and should have consulted the official record to determine the legal zoning classification of its property.  Carolina Chloride's owner and its broker are both experienced in business matters, but it appears that neither [the Company] nor his broker personally inspected the County's official records prior to making a sizable investment in developing the property."  The Court reversed the appellate court's decision with respect to the directed verdict as to the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court affirmed the appellate court on all other matters. View "Carolina Chloride v. Richland County" on Justia Law

Appellant Charleston County School District (School District) appealed a circuit court's order that granted a Rule 12(b)(6) SCRCP motion to dismiss its complaint that alleged the unconstitutionality of Act. No. 189 of 2005 (Act 189), as well as its decision to dismiss the Governor as a party to this action. South Carolina adopted a charter school law in 1996, called the South Carolina Charter Schools Act.  The General Assembly amended the Charter Schools Act once in 2002 and again in 2006.  In the Charter Schools Act, the General Assembly provided rules governing all aspects of the organization, approval, and operation of charter schools in South Carolina, as well as the obligations of each sponsoring school district. The School District filed a complaint against Speaker of the House Robert Harrell, President of the Senate Andre Bauer, Governor Mark Sanford, and the State of South Carolina seeking a declaratory judgment that Act 189 was unconstitutional.  The complaint alleged that Act 189 was special legislation in violation of the South Carolina Constitution because the subject of charter schools was already comprehensively addressed by the Charter Schools Act and Act 189 only applied to Charleston County's charter schools without any reasonable basis for doing so. Though the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the Governor, the Court found that the School District's complaint sufficiently states a cause of action that Act 189 is unconstitutional.   The Court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Charleston County School District v. Harrell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review a circuit court's order granting post-conviction relief (PCR) to Defendant Kelle Holden as to her guilty plea.  The State contended the circuit court judge erred in finding plea counsel ineffective for failing to adequately (1) discuss the charges with Holden, and (2) explaining to Defendant that she was pleading guilty without a sentence recommendation from the State. In 2005 Defendant was arrested and indicted for numerous charges stemming from her participation, along with several other co-defendants, in a series of car break-ins that occurred in Greenville County over a six-month period.  Following her arrest, Holden cooperated with law enforcement and gave a statement regarding her involvement. In 2006, Defendant pled guilty to multiple drug, larceny and theft charges. The plea judge sentenced Defendant to several concurrent sentences for each of the charges against her. Defendant appealed her guilty plea and sentences to the Court of Appeals.  She voluntarily chose to withdraw her appeal.  After the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, Defendant filed a timely application for PCR in which she alleged that ineffective assistance of plea counsel rendered her guilty plea involuntary. When asked about the plea proceeding, Defendant acknowledged the judge had questioned her regarding her decision to plead guilty and had discussed the maximum sentences for each of the charges.  Defendant also recalled the solicitor's statement that there was no sentence recommendation.  At the conclusion of her cross-examination testimony, Defendant admitted she would not have filed the PCR application had she received less than a three-year sentence. The judge concluded that plea counsel "misadvised [Holden] about the sentence she would receive if she accepted the State's plea offer and entered a guilty plea."  The Supreme Court's review of the plea proceeding revealed that Defendant was clearly aware of the elements of the charged offenses, the State's evidence as to the charges, and the potential sentences. The Court found no probative evidence to support the PCR judge's finding that Holden received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to her guilty plea. The Court reversed the PCR judge's decision and reinstated Defendant's guilty plea. View "Holden v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

After Appellant Donald Brandt produced a fraudulent document in a civil proceeding, a circuit court held Appellant in civil and criminal contempt.  In turn, the court dismissed Appellant's legal malpractice action with prejudice and ordered him to serve six months in jail and pay the defendants' attorneys' fees. In 1998, Appellant sued Elizabeth Gooding and her law firm Gooding & Gooding, P.A. for legal malpractice based on Gooding's representation of him in a real estate transaction.  During the course of discovery, Appellant presented to his attorney a document which appeared to have been sent the lender in the transaction to Appellant on September 18, 1995.  Appellant also provided the letter to his malpractice expert.  The letter was then introduced in the expert's deposition and used by him to opine that Gooding had committed malpractice. The document, if authentic, would have imputed knowledge to Gooding of a conflict of interest related to the representation of Appellant in the real estate transaction.  Gooding, however, claimed the document was fraudulent.  As a result, Gooding requested a hearing to determine whether the document was authentic.  Additionally, Gooding requested the court hold Appellant in contempt and award costs if such authenticity could not be established. Subsequently, based on the fraudulent document, the State indicted Appellant for forgery.  After a jury found Appellant guilty of the indicted offense, the trial judge sentenced Brandt to ten years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of four years, followed by five years' probation and payment of restitution. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant contended that the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss the forgery indictment and in failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict on the ground that Double Jeopardy barred the forgery prosecution.  Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the State presented sufficient evidence to support a forgery conviction.  Because the forged document did not involve a dollar amount and the State did not present evidence of a definitive dollar amount, the Court held that the trial judge erred in sentencing Appellant for felony forgery. The Court remanded the case back to the circuit court for resentencing. View "South Carolina v. Brandt" on Justia Law

Appellant Abel Jacobs appealed a circuit court's decision holding that a sentence for burglary in the first degree cannot be suspended under the language of South Carolina Code section 24-21-410.  In January 2010, Appellant pled guilty to a variety of criminal charges, including a charge for first degree burglary.  At the plea hearing, defense counsel asked the circuit judge to suspend the minimum fifteen year sentence for first degree burglary in lieu of placing Appellant under probation.  Defense counsel opined that state courts have routinely suspended sentences for first degree burglary, and the State has never appealed those sentences.  The circuit judge deferred sentencing Appellant for the first degree burglary conviction at the plea hearing, and requested the parties submit memoranda in support of their positions regarding the suspension issue.  The circuit judge subsequently issued an order finding that a sentence for the conviction of first degree burglary is not suspendable under section 24-21-410 of the South Carolina Code.  At the sentencing hearing, the circuit judge sentenced Appellant to fifteen years imprisonment for first degree burglary, along with  concurrent sentences for remaining charges, crediting Appellant for time served prior to his guilty plea. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that section 24-21-410 of the South Carolina code does not give courts the authority to suspend sentences for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, and this includes crimes that include lesser sentences than death or life imprisonment.  Therefore, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "South Carolina v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) initiated termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings against M.R.C.L. (mother) and R.L. (father). Child was removed from mother and father's home in May 2007 due to allegations of physical neglect, after both parents tested positive for crack cocaine. Child, who was one year old at the time, was placed in a pre-adoptive foster home with two of her siblings. After a merits hearing, the family court ordered mother and father to complete a treatment plan, including a drug and alcohol assessment and a parental assessment, and to maintain safe and appropriate housing. Mother and father did not complete the treatment plan. The Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) testified that, in her opinion, it was in child's best interest to terminate mother and father's parental rights and allow the foster parents to adopt child. The family court terminated mother and father's parental rights, generally finding (1) mother and father willfully failed to visit the child; (2) mother and father willfully failed to support the child; and (3) termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appealed the termination, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding DSS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that mother willfully failed to support or visit the child. Because the Court of Appeals found DSS failed to prove any statutory ground for TPR, it did not reach the issue whether TPR was in the best interest of the child. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the family court's finding that mother willfully failed to support the child. Specifically, considering all the facts and circumstances of this case, DSS showed by clear and convincing evidence that mother willfully failed to support child. The Court held the family court properly found TPR was in child's best interest. View "So. Carolina Dept. of Social Svcs. v. M.R.C.L." on Justia Law

Albert Epstein sued Coastal Timber Co., Inc. (Coastal) for damages, alleging that Coastal cut and removed standing timber that was subject to mortgages he held on property he owned. The circuit court found Mr. Epstein failed to properly secure an interest in the timber under South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Epstein appealed that decision, arguing that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Coastal after finding his mortgages did not constitute a lien on the standing timber cut by Coastal. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Epstein that the UCC did not convert all standing timber to goods and thereby divest him of his interest in the timber. The Court concluded that "the proper analysis is not one of cancellation but of priority. [...] any security interest later recorded on timber to be cut under a contract of sale would be junior to any existing interests. To hold otherwise would allow a mortgagor to unilaterally void an existing lien imposed by a mortgage on the real property, which includes the timber, simply by thereafter executing a contract to sell the timber." The Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Epstein v. Coastal Timber Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Georgetown County League of Women Voters appealed an order that dismissed its action that sought a declaration that Respondent Smith Land Company had unlawfully filled wetlands and dismissed its request for an injunction requiring Smith to restore those wetlands. Respondent owns a .332 acre lot in Pawleys Island, .19 acres of which are isolated wetlands often referred to as Carolina Bays. Before developing the lot, Respondent notified both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) of its plans. While the Corps cautioned respondent to notify DHEC before performing the work and respondent did so, it received no response from DHEC. Respondent then filled the wetlands. The League then filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and related equitable relief. After a hearing, the circuit court held that DHEC did not have jurisdiction over isolated wetlands, that Respondent complied with all requirements before filling the wetlands, and that the League could not maintain a private suit under the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Finding that the circuit court erred in holding that: (1) the DHEC lacked jurisdiction to regulate the wetlands; (2) Respondent did not violate the Act; and (3) the Act does not create a private cause of action, the Supreme Court reversed the reversed the case and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Georgetown County League of Women Voters v. Smith Land Co." on Justia Law

Appellants A & A Taxi, Inc. and the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Uninsured Employers' Fund appealed a circuit court order that found Respondent Robert Pikaart was an employee of A & A Taxi, Inc. at the time he was injured in two automobile accidents and that he was entitled to certain workers' compensation benefits. Appellants contended Pikaart was an independent contractor, not an employee; therefore, the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission had no jurisdiction in this matter. They further argued the circuit court improperly made findings of fact that did not bear on the limited issue of jurisdiction that was before it. Because the issue on appeal concerned jurisdiction, the Supreme Court took its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court held that the facts in this case were preponderantly in favor of a finding that Pikaart was the general manager of A & A Taxi and as such, was an employee subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. To the extent Appellants contended the circuit court erred in making additional findings of fact that were not related to jurisdiction, the Court found the issue was not preserved for review. Consequently, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order in full. View "Pikaart v. A & A Taxi" on Justia Law

The State appealed the trial court's grant of Respondent Robert Nance's pre-trial motion to suppress the testimony of the victim in Respondent's new trial after the Supreme Court granted post-conviction relief (PCR) in "Nance v. Ozmint" (Nance II). Robert Fraley survived Respondent's attack in 1993 and testified at the first trial but died before Respondent was retried. Respondent argued that, because in "Nance II" the Supreme Court found he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel's failure to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing, he lacked the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Fraley as required by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, Respondent argued, the State could not read Mr. Fraley's testimony into the record as an unavailable witness under Rule 804 of the rules of evidence, because it would violate his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Fraley was sworn during the first trial, and Respondent had the opportunity to cross-examine him as required by the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court found that the circuit court erred in suppressing Mr. Fraley's testimony. The Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Nance" on Justia Law