Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' analysis and disposition of Petitioner Jamey Reid's conviction and sentence for attempted second-degree criminal sexual contact (CSC) with a minor. The single issue before the Court was whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's denial of Petitioner's directed verdict motion. Petitioner entered an Internet chat room believing he was chatting with a fourteen-year-old female. The supposed minor was, in fact, a Westminster Police Officer. Petitioner quickly turned the conversation to one of a sexual nature, as he desired a sexual encounter with the girl. Petitioner would later be indicted and tried. At the close of the State's case, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict in connection with the attempted CSC charge, arguing that the State had failed to present evidence of an overt act as required by the attempted CSC charge. Because the trial court held there was sufficient evidence presented to create a jury question, the directed verdict motion was denied. The jury convicted Petitioner on both charges, and he was sentenced. Petitioner contended the evidence, as a matter of law, was insufficient on the question of specific intent and further rose only to the level of "mere preparation," entitling him to a directed verdict of acquittal on the attempted CSC charge. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that because a jury question was presented, the directed verdict motion was properly denied. View "South Carolina v. Reid" on Justia Law

The Town of Mount Pleasant (Town) appealed the circuit court's order reversing and dismissing Defendant Treva Roberts's municipal court conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) on the ground the arresting officer's vehicle was not equipped with a video camera pursuant to the pertinent section of the South Carolina Code. The Town argued on appeal that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because Defendant failed to obtain a bond or pay her court-ordered fine prior to initiating her appeal. Furthermore, the Town contended that the court erred in "narrowly construing" the pertinent code to require the reversal of Defendant's DUI conviction and dismissal of the charge. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court judge erred in classifying the Town's jurisdictional challenge as one involving subject matter jurisdiction. Because Defendant timely served her notice of appeal on the municipal court, she met the procedural requirements. As such, her failure to obtain a bond or pay the court-ordered fine did not divest the circuit court of appellate jurisdiction. As to the merits, the Court found that the Town's prolonged failure to equip its patrol vehicles with video cameras defeated the intent of the state law mandating their use. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Town should not be able to avoid its statutorily created obligation to produce a videotape by repeatedly relying on the code. Because the Town failed to establish any statutory exception to excuse its noncompliance, the Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Defendant's DUI charge and conviction and dismissed the charge. View "Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the results of a town council election in Atlantic Beach, South Carolina, held on November 3, 2009. Carolyn Cole and Windy Price (Appellants) appealed the circuit court order that affirmed the Town of Atlantic Beach Municipal Election Commission's (MEC) decision to de-certify and order a new election for two Atlantic Beach Town Councilmember positions. On November 3, 2009, the Town of Atlantic Beach held an election for the two positions on town council. After the polls closed, there were 39 contested ballots. The MEC held a challenged ballot hearing, after which, 28 of the challenged ballots were accepted. These accepted ballots included those of Price and Cole. The MEC conducted two protest hearings. In pertinent part, the MEC heard testimony concerning the allegations raised in several letters of protest that contested the election of Appellants on the grounds that Appellants failed to meet the residency requirements to run as candidates. At the close of the second hearing, a majority of the Commissioners voted to grant petitions for a new election. On that same day, Appellants appealed the MEC's decision to the circuit court. The MEC did not issue a written order until January 29, 2010. That order summarily found Appellants did not meet the residency requirements of running for public office. The MEC de-certified the election results and ordered a new election. The circuit court judge heard the appeal in May 2010, and issued an order that same day affirming the decision of the MEC. Upon review, the issues before the Supreme Court pertained to whether there was sufficient evidence in the MECs record to support its decision to decertify and order new elections. Appellants argued that the Supreme Court should vacate the MEC's decision to de-certify and order a new election because the MEC failed to comply with the requirements of the South Carolina Code that delineates the procedure for contesting results of a municipal election. The Court believed that the Town's "complete disregard of the provisions of section the statute was perpetuated by a conscious decision to ignore the will of the voters, and this delay ultimately undermined the legislative purpose behind requiring the expeditious handling of election disputes." Therefore, the Court agreed with Appellants and vacated the decision of the MEC. Accordingly, the MEC's initial certification of the town council election declaring Appellants Cole and Price as winners was restored. View "Cole v. Town of Atlantic Beach Election Commission" on Justia Law

The State alleged Defendant Sammyeil Barber and three others (Blake Kimbrell, Kenneth Walker, and Marcus Kiser) conspired to rob a drug dealer, Alan Heintz. The men gathered together and discussed the plans for the robbery, procured a semi-automatic handgun and then drove to Heintz's house. Upon discovering more people than expected at the house, they left to procure a second firearm. The men returned to Heintz's house and Kimbrell waited in the car while Barber, Walker, and Kiser went inside. Heintz was dragged from his bedroom and ultimately drew a shotgun on the robbers. One of the suspects armed with a semi-automatic handgun shot and killed Heintz and shot and wounded another man who was sleeping on the couch. The three men fled the premises, stealing only $30 and leaving the second firearm behind. Kimbrell, Walker, and Kiser all implicated Barber in the planning and execution of the robbery and said he was the gunman who shot Heintz. They pled guilty and testified against Barber, each receiving 15–30 years. At Barber's trial, Kimbrell, Walker, and Kiser all testified Barber was armed with the semi-automatic handgun and had shot both victims. On appeal, Barber argued the accomplice liability charge against him was improper because it was unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that the charge was properly supported by the evidence presented at trial. The Court affirmed Barber's conviction and sentence. View "Barber v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant "J. Doe" brought an action against Respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) alleging various theories of negligence. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart. This case arose from the physical and sexual abuse of then three-year-old J. Doe (also "the victim"). "F. Doe" is the victim's guardian ad litem and great uncle. F. Doe and his wife (aunt) often kept the victim for months at a time. According to the aunt, both of the victim's parents physically abused him beginning when he was three months old. In August 1997, after arriving at her house, the aunt examined the victim and found two "wide strips" of bruising on his buttocks. She did not contact the police or the Department of Social Services (DSS) or seek medical treatment. Instead, she took two photographs of the victim's buttocks. Several days later, the aunt took the roll of film to Wal-Mart to be developed. When the aunt retrieved the photos, a photo technician informed her she had destroyed some of the photos because of a store policy requiring the destruction of photos depicting nudity. The aunt claimed the employee told her she was required to "destroy them," which the aunt believed meant the employee had destroyed the photos and the negatives. The aunt left the store with the remainder of the photos and all of the negatives, but erroneously believed the negatives depicting the victim's buttocks had been destroyed. The father pled guilty to first degree criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. In 2003, Appellant filed suit arguing the victim's injuries from the sexual abuse were a result of Wal-Mart's failure to report the suspected physical abuse depicted in the photos as required by the Reporter's Statute and/or Wal-Mart's negligent hiring and supervision of its employees and its violations of approximately twenty internal company policies. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart was proper because there could be no civil liability under the state Reporter's Statute and Wal-Mart owed no duty to the victim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Doe v. Walmart" on Justia Law

Defendant James Miller appealed the circuit court's order committing him to the custody of the Department of Mental Health under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), asserting that the State failed to try the case within sixty days of the probable cause hearing as mandated by the SVPA. In September 2001, Miller pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child under the age of sixteen years and criminal domestic violence. In May 2005, prior to his scheduled release date of December 1, 2005, the Department of Corrections referred Miller's case to the multidisciplinary team to assess whether Miller constituted a "Sexually Violent Predator" (SVP) as defined by the SVPA. Having determined that Miller satisfied the statutory definition of an SVP, the multidisciplinary team referred the case to the prosecutor's review committee. While the State assembled its case for committing Miller, it asked for several continuances. In January 2006, Miller filed a motion to dismiss the commitment hearing, arguing that the State's petition "should be dismissed with prejudice due to the State's failure to pursue the prosecution of this matter in a reasonably timely manner." Specifically, counsel claimed that the "case should have been tried on or before January 4, 2006 because [Miller's] continued incarceration beyond December 1, 2005 [was] certainly prejudicial." In opposition, the State claimed it had "good cause" for a continuance as the forensic psychiatrist, who conducted all of the state's SVP evaluations, was unable to complete the evaluation within the sixty-day time period. The circuit court conducted a hearing the same day the motion to dismiss was filed; however, the court did not rule on the motion but instead took it under advisement. The court issued an order denying Miller's motion to dismiss in July. Although the court expressed its displeasure with the State's routine delay in initiating the SVP process, it found the State's interest in proceeding with the SVP trial outweighed the prejudice to Miller. Additionally, the court found there was no substantial prejudice to Miller. The Court of Appeals affirmed Miller's civil commitment. Although the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, the Court used this case as an opportunity to clarify certain procedural aspects of the SVPA. Specifically, Court considered the appropriate remedy when the State fails to timely conduct a civil commitment trial within the time provisions mandated by the SVPA. The Court held that if an inmate is granted a dismissal the proceedings should be dismissed without prejudice to the State. If the motion to dismiss is granted, the inmate may be released from custody while the State re-files its petition to the circuit court provided that the inmate has completed his sentence as determined by the Department of Corrections. View "In the Matter of James Miller" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant-Attorney James Brown was appointed to represent Alfonzo Howard. Mr. Howard was charged with multiple crimes, including first degree criminal sexual conduct, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime. From the beginning, Appellant complained about the appointment, first to the circuit's chief administrative judge, and then to the trial judge. The charges against Howard proceeded to trial.  During the trial, Appellant's belligerent unwillingness to comply with the court's order continued. The trial court, "displaying remarkable patience," only threatened Appellant with contempt and instructed Appellant to proceed.  Appellant then invoked his right to counsel.  The trial against Howard was briefly continued to allow Appellant's attorney to appear.  After consulting with his attorney, Appellant finally decided to continue with representation of the indigent defendant. The trial judge awarded costs for investigative work and expert fees, which was substantially in excess of the statutory cap of $500. However, the court denied Appellant's motion to award attorney's fees in excess of the $3,500 statutory amount. The sole basis for denying Appellant an award of fees in excess of the statutory cap was his unprofessional conduct.  During the pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court accepted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the South Carolina Bar concerning the potential constitutional implications arising from the court appointment of attorneys to represent indigent clients.  The Supreme Court elected to address this matter of significant public interest.  The Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is implicated when an attorney is appointed by the court to represent an indigent litigant.  In such circumstances, the attorney's services constitute property entitling the attorney to just compensation. However in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion for denying Appellant fees in excess of the statutory cap for his behavior at trial. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Brown v. Howard" on Justia Law

This appeal was the culmination of the Town of James Island's (Town) third attempt to incorporate into its own municipal body. The two previous attempts were invalidated by the Supreme Court. In this case, the Court found that the Town's incorporation petition was again insufficient. In reversing a lower court's approval of the Town's petition, the Court took the opportunity to guide Petitioners with a legally sufficient framework for the Town and other unincorporated areas to successfully petition for incorporation in the future. View "Cabiness v. Town of James Island" on Justia Law

Respondent optometrist Steven Hobbs sublet space leased by Cole Vision Corporation (Cole Vision) from Sears Roebuck and Company (Sears) for his optometry practice. The sublease agreement between Hobbs and Cole Vision contained indemnity provisions whereby Hobbs agreed to defend Cole Vision and Sears against any and all liabilities arising from events occurring in Hobbs' business location or as a result of Hobbs' activities at the business. The agreement also purportedly required Cole Vision to retain copies of Hobbs' patient records. Pursuant to the agreement, Hobbs obtained professional liability insurance with NCMIC Insurance Company (NCMIC). Mary and John Lewis (the Lewises) sued Hobbs, Cole Vision, and Sears based on Hobbs' alleged malpractice in failing to properly diagnose and treat Mary Lewis. Cole Vision and Sears brought this action for declaratory relief after Hobbs and NCMIC refused to defend them in the malpractice suit. Although the Lewises' case was pending when Cole Vision brought this declaratory judgment action, it eventually settled. Cole Vision and Sears also sought judgment against Hobbs and NCMIC for defense costs and settlement amounts of the malpractice action brought by the Lewises. In response to the complaint, Hobbs filed a defense and counterclaim for negligent spoliation of evidence against Cole Vision and Sears stemming from the loss of Mary Lewis's patient profile sheet. Hobbs contended that Cole Vision lost the profile sheet, which was a key piece of evidence needed to defend the malpractice claim. According to Hobbs, he incurred costs and attorney fees as a result of his inability to adequately defend against the Lewises' claim for malpractice. Cole Vision filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that South Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for spoliation of evidence. The circuit court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. Hobbs appealed the circuit court's order and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court, finding that Hobbs pled facts sufficient to constitute a general negligence cause of action. The court of appeals did not determine whether South Carolina recognizes a cause of action for negligent spoliation, instead reversing the circuit court based on its characterization of Hobbs' claim as a general negligence claim. Upon review of the record of the courts below, the Supreme Court found that Hobbs' claim that Cole Vision breached a contractual duty to maintain the document at issue remained a viable defense in his action for indemnification. The Court declined to recognize the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence and accordingly found that the circuit court properly dismissed it as a counterclaim. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cole Vision v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Following the resolution of his partition action in probate court, Petitioner James Judy (James) filed a "waste" suit in circuit court against his brother, Respondent Ronnie Judy (Ronnie), for the destruction of a pond located on a tract of real property involved in the partition. A jury found in favor of James and awarded him damages. Ronnie appealed the jury's verdict, arguing the circuit court erred in declining to dismiss the suit against him on the basis of laches, collateral estoppel, or res judicata. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss Ronnie's suit on the basis of collateral estoppel and laches. However, the court reversed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss the suit on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court granted James's petition to review the appellate court's decision as to whether res judicata operated to preclude the waste lawsuit. James contended the prior probate court action was conducted for the limited purpose of partitioning the real property of the Estate. Because the subject matter of his waste claim was not identical to the partition action, James asserted that the requisite elements of res judicata were not satisfied. The Supreme Court found that because the tort duties that were breached and the evidence was the same in both the probate and waste proceedings, there was "identity of subject matter" for the purposes of res judicata. Yet in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, James attempted to "split" his cause of action for waste by pursuing and procuring another remedy in circuit court for an identical claim. Given the probate court could have fully adjudicated the waste cause of action, James was precluded from initiating a second lawsuit in the circuit court as this cause of action could have been raised in the former suit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision effectively dismissing James' appeal. View "Judy v. Judy" on Justia Law