Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following the resolution of his partition action in probate court, Petitioner James Judy (James) filed a "waste" suit in circuit court against his brother, Respondent Ronnie Judy (Ronnie), for the destruction of a pond located on a tract of real property involved in the partition. A jury found in favor of James and awarded him damages. Ronnie appealed the jury's verdict, arguing the circuit court erred in declining to dismiss the suit against him on the basis of laches, collateral estoppel, or res judicata. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss Ronnie's suit on the basis of collateral estoppel and laches. However, the court reversed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss the suit on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court granted James's petition to review the appellate court's decision as to whether res judicata operated to preclude the waste lawsuit. James contended the prior probate court action was conducted for the limited purpose of partitioning the real property of the Estate. Because the subject matter of his waste claim was not identical to the partition action, James asserted that the requisite elements of res judicata were not satisfied. The Supreme Court found that because the tort duties that were breached and the evidence was the same in both the probate and waste proceedings, there was "identity of subject matter" for the purposes of res judicata. Yet in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, James attempted to "split" his cause of action for waste by pursuing and procuring another remedy in circuit court for an identical claim. Given the probate court could have fully adjudicated the waste cause of action, James was precluded from initiating a second lawsuit in the circuit court as this cause of action could have been raised in the former suit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision effectively dismissing James' appeal. View "Judy v. Judy" on Justia Law

Appellants the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM), and the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League appealed a final order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that granted Respondent Jerry Risher's "critical area permit" application to construct a bridge over a portion of wetlands contained within his property on Fripp Island. Respondent owns less than a half-acre, half of which is "upland high ground" or build-able property. The remainder of the property partially surrounds the build-able portion and is composed of wetlands. One year prior to Respondent's purchase of the lot, his predecessor in title applied to the DHEC and was approved for a critical area permit to construct a vehicular bridge across the non-build-able wetland portion of the lot to connect with the nearest vehicular road. In 2006, Respondent began to construct a bridge similar to the one previously submitted and approved by his predecessor in title. To that end, Respondent submitted a permit application to OCRM. OCRM took the matter under advisement but ultimately denied Respondent's application based on its finding that the upland build-able portion of the lot qualified as a coastal island which was too small to allow bridge access. After exhausting DHEC's review options, Respondent filed a request for review by the ALC. A hearing was held, and the ALC issued an order reversing DHEC's denial of Respondent's permit request. DHEC appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that there was insufficient evidence before the ALC to reverse its decision. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence sufficient to support the ALC's decision. The Court affirmed the ALC's decision in support of Respondent. View "Risher v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control " on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a class action lawsuit brought by Appellants John Doe #53, John Doe #66, John Doe #66A, John Doe #67, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2 and Rachel Roe. The plaintiffs in the underlying class action consisted of two classes: one for victims of childhood sexual abuse by agents of the Diocese and one for the spouses and parents of victims. A settlement in the class action was approved by the trial judge over Appellants' objections. Appellants moved to alter or amend the order approving the settlement. While Appellants' motion to alter or amend was pending, they reached a separate settlement agreement with the Diocese and class counsel. This agreement provided that the Diocese would pay Appellants $1.375 million to their settle claims, in exchange for Appellants' agreement to opt out of the class action, execute releases, and withdraw all pending motions and objections with prejudice. Appellants presented several issues for the Supreme Court's review, including some relating to the trial court's approval of the settlement agreements. Upon consideration of the arguments presented by the class, the Supreme Court found that due to the executed settlement agreement, there were no issues for further consideration. The Court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Doe v. Bishop of Charleston" on Justia Law

The Town of Rockville is listed in the National Register of Historic Places. Appellant Marc Merrill owns a historic home in Rockville. The property abuts a marsh. Appellant obtained a permit from the state Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) to construct a dock and walkway on property he owned in Respondent Town of Rockville (Rockville). He then sought approval to construct the dock from the Rockville Design Review Board DRB which, pursuant to a newly adopted municipal ordinance, had to approve the construction of any dock or walkway already permitted by OCRM. The DRB declined to approve construction, and Appellant unsuccessfully appealed to circuit court. Although appellants raised numerous issues on appeal, the Supreme Court addressed only whether the evidence presented to the DRB was sufficient to support its conclusion that Appellant's proposed dock and walkway would impede a scenic rural view. Upon consideration of the DRB's review of Appellant's dock proposal, the Court found that there was simply nothing in the record to support the DRB's finding. Accordingly, the Court reversed both the DRB's and circuit court's decisions in this case, and remanded it for further proceedings. View "Rockville Haven v. Town of Rockville" on Justia Law

Appellant Friends of the Hunley, Inc., (Friends) is a non-profit corporation dedicated to the recovery and conservation of the H.L. Hunley Confederate submarine. In 2001, Petitioner Edward Sloan submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to Friends seeking a list of documents pertaining to Friends' corporate structure and legal relationship with the Hunley Commission, a state agency. Friends denied that it was subject to FOIA and declined to produce the documents. In 2001, Mr. Sloan filed a complaint seeking production of the documents based on Friends' status either as a public body under FOIA or as an alter ego of the Hunley Commission. Approximately one month later, Friends fully complied with Mr. Sloan's document request, but stated that it was not tendering the documents "due to any concession that [Friends] is subject to the Freedom of Information Act," but "in the spirit of cooperation." Following a series of cross-motions, the trial court granted Friends' motion for summary judgment, finding Mr. Sloan lacked standing to maintain the action and that there was no controversy since Friends had produced the very documents sought in the complaint. Following a Supreme Court decision in the case, Mr. Sloan moved in the trial court for an award of attorney's fees under FOIA. In 2009, the trial court granted Mr. Sloan's motion and awarded attorney's fees to include those incurred from the beginning of the litigation up to the granting of the motion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Friends challenged the FOIA-based attorney's fee award to Sloan. Specifically, Friends argued Sloan was not a prevailing party and, in any event, was not entitled to relief beyond the date the requested documents were produced. Upon consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that Mr. Sloan was the "prevailing party" and the trial court properly awarded him attorney's fees. However, in view of the law of this case in from the earlier decision, the Court found that the trial court erred in awarding fees beyond the time that Friends provided the requested information to Mr. Sloan. The Court partly affirmed, and partly reversed the lower court decisions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sloan v. Friends of the Hunley" on Justia Law

Appellants Larry and Jeannie Boiter were injured when the motorcycle they were riding collided with a car driven by Nancy Kochenower at an intersection. The red light signal bulb for the road Ms. Kochenower was traveling on had burned out earlier that day. The Boiters suffered significant injuries. They settled with Ms. Kochenhower for her policy limits and sued Respondents the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) and the South Carolina Department of Public Safety (SCDPS), alleging negligence in their failure to prevent the accident. At trial, a jury found in favor of the Boiters and awarded them a total of $1.875 million. Respondents filed motions for "judgment notwithstanding the verdict," for a new trial, and to reduce the amount of the verdict pursuant to the state's Tort Claims Act. In response, the Boiters filed a motion to challenge the constitutionality of the two-tier cap in the Tort Claims Act. In the alternative, the Boiters argued that Respondents' negligence constituted two separate occurrences of negligence under the Act (one for each Appellant), and as such, were entitled to separate damages awards. The circuit court denied all parties' motions, and found that there was only one occurrence of negligence. The court reduced the damages to $600,000. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed part of the trial court's order. The Court found that the two-tier statutory cap on damages is constitutional, but that more than one occurrence of negligence occurred at the time of the accident. The Court remanded the case for reconsideration of the damages award. View "Boiter v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

Appellant Martha Argoe's husband had her committed to Three Rivers Behavioral Health, LLC (Three Rivers). In June 2005, the probate court accepted the petition, and issued an order to have Mrs. Argoe involuntarily committed to the hospital and examined by licensed physicians. Physicians determined that Mrs. Agroe suffered from bipolar disorder with manic and psychotic features. Mrs. Argoe submitted to additional tests, and was prescribed medication as part of her therapy. In June 2007, Mrs. Argoe sued her husband, son and the hospitals, physicians and nurses who were involved in the involuntary commitment proceedings. She asserted multiple causes of action, including "intentional infliction of emotional distress," false imprisonment, conspiracy, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Three Rivers moved for summary judgment, arguing among other things, that Mrs. Argoe's claims should have been brought in 2005 when the original commitment order was issued. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mrs. Argoe argued that the probate court's order was invalid. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that Mrs. Argoe failed to timely and properly challenge the 2005 probate court orders, and that Three Rivers' conduct toward her was lawful, justified and reasonable. The Court affirmed the probate court's order.

In March 2000, Theodora Miles sought a divorce from James Miles. Prior to the final hearing, the parties reached an agreement on many issues pertaining to the division of the marital property, health insurance, child support and custody. Six years later, Mr. Miles sought to modify the settlement agreement due to a "substantial change in circumstances." In particular, Mr. Miles sought a reduction in his child support payments, and to stop paying for his ex-wife's health insurance. The issue before the family court was whether the agreement to provide the health insurance was a modifiable support obligation or a non-modifiable agreement similar to a division of property. The family court found "unambiguously" that the health insurance was not support. The court denied Mr. Miles' modification. The appellate court affirmed the family court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Miles argued that both the family court and the appellate court were wrong in holding the health insurance was a support obligation. The Supreme Court reversed both lower court decisions, holding that the agreement provided a "modifiable incident of support in the form of health and dental insurance as a matter of law." The record reflected that the change in Mr. Miles' circumstances merited a modification because his earning capacity diminished significantly since the divorce decree, while Mrs. Miles' circumstances substantially improved. The Court remanded the case to the family court for further proceedings.

After his conviction for homicide, Petitioner Lucas Bailey filed an unsuccessful application for post conviction relief. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleged his counsel failed to object to jury instructions that allowed the jury to convict him for an act that was not in the indictment. Upon careful consideration of the record below, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge may have engaged in an off-the-record discussion with the jury: "we are troubled that the decision regarding the jury instruction may have been made without the judge conferring with the attorneys." The Court vacated Petitioner's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Bailey v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In this divorce action, the Supreme Court was asked to review two decisions of the appellate court involving the valuation of the marital home and an award of expert witness fees. Both issues involve determinations of fact. "An appellate court should approach an equitable division award with a presumption that the family court acted within its broad discretion. The family court should be reversed only when the appellant demonstrates an abuse of discretion," not for determinations of fact. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's reversal of the family court because there was no clear demonstration of an abuse of that discretion. The Court reinstated the ruling of the family court. View "Lewis v. Lewis" on Justia Law