Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gregory and Kerry Brown appealed the circuit court's confirmation of an arbitration award that was granted to their former general contractor C-Sculptures. C-Sculptures built the Browns' house. The Browns claimed C-Sculptures was precluded from enforcing a contract between them because the contractor's license limited the contractor to work totaling $100,000. C-Sculptures' final invoice totaled over $800,000, and when the Browns refused to pay, the contractor placed a lien on their property for the unpaid amount. The arbitrator awarded C-Sculptures the money it was owed, and the Browns appealed the arbitrator's award to the circuit court, arguing that the statutory limit on the contractor's license limited payment to $100,000. On review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitrator followed the statutory scheme to make his determination in favor of the contractor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's confirmation of the arbitrator's award.

George Grumbos (Husband) contested the family court's decision to impute certain income to him when it granted his wife Demetra Grumbos' temporary and permanent alimony. In its final order, the family court found both parties were underemployed, and both were able to work. Based on his past W2s, the court imputed $4,500 per month to the Husband, which was more than he was actually earning at the time. In assessing the parties' debts, the court considered three promissory notes the Husband executed, loaning his brothers and parents over $100,000. Based on these findings, the court awarded the Wife $630 per month as alimony. The Husband challenged the court's calculation of the Wife's alimony award. The Supreme Court found that the family court properly weighed the testimony and evidence, and accurately assessed the Husband's income. However, in its holding, the Court found that the family court erroneously made the Husband pay the Wife's attorney's fees. The Court affirmed the alimony award, but reversed the award of attorney fees and remanded the case for further proceedings.

"The Hamlets" is a subdivision within Crowfield Plantation. Covenants for the subdivision were drafted and recorded in 1991. The covenants created an Architectural Review Board that would enforce the terms of the covenants of the subdivision. Respondents John and Pamela Matsell live in the Hamlets, and their lot abuts a golf course. Their next door neighbors built a fence that covers the majority of the backyard that can be seen from the street that fronts the property, in violation of the covenants. In 2007, the Matsells filed a complaint with the Architectural Review Board to have the Board order the neighbors to remove the fence. When the Board did not comply, the Matsells filed their complaint with the circuit court. The Board argued that it had discretion in interpreting and enforcing the subdivision covenants. The trial court read the "clear language" of the covenants, and found the fence was in violation. The court granted the Matsells summary judgment, and the Board appealed. The Supreme Court found the language of the covenants was plain and unambiguous, and did not allow for a fence that could be seen from the street. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision granting the Matsells summary judgment.

Defendant James Miller appealed an order of the circuit court that tolled his probation while he was civilly committed as a sexually violent predator. In 1998, Defendant pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a minor, and other domestic violence charges. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 15 years: ten years' in prison and five years' probation for the lewd act charge. The circuit court found that Defendant would benefit from supervision, and tolled Defendant's probation until his release from commitment. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court found that under the circumstances, tolling Defendant's probation was consistent with the spirit of rehabilitation and protection of the public. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

American Media Services, LLC (AMS) appealed an arbitration award that was decided in favor of former employee, Respondent Mark Steinmetz. Steinmetz claimed AMS breached his employment agreement, and the parties agreed to settle the dispute through arbitration. The arbitrator found in favor of Steinmetz. AMS filed a motion to have the award reconsidered by the circuit court, but the court entered judgment in accordance with the arbitrator's findings. The Supreme Court found in submitting its appeal, AMS did not appeal the order of the circuit court, it appealed the order of the arbitrator. Accordingly, the Court did not have jurisdiction over AMS' claim and dismissed it.

The Supreme Court reversed the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and Administrative Law Court's (ALC) decision against Appellant Peter Brown. Appellant is a Medicaid recipient who is disabled and mentally retarded. Appellant qualified for a program that allowed him to move from an intermediate care facility and into a supervised living facility for people with mental disabilities. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services waived the statutory requirement that individuals with mental disabilities live in an institution to have Medicaid pay for the associated expenses in the supervised living arrangement. In 2005, the center informed Appellant that it would terminate Appellant's 12-hour weekly one-on-one service that had allowed him to remain at the center and out of the institution. Appellant appealed to the DHHS; the hearing officer found that the one-on-one service was not eligible for Medicaid under the waiver because Appellant could not prove the service was necessary to keep him out of the institution. Appellant appealed to the ALC, and the ALC affirmed the DHHS hearing officer's decision. The Supreme Court, in review of the case found that the hearing officer did not have jurisdiction to hear Appellant's appeal, and found the ALC applied an incorrect legal standard. Accordingly, the Court vacated the ALC's order and remanded the case back to DHHS for an additional hearing.

Appellant Liberty Life Insurance Company denied insurance proceeds to Stephen Ney's beneficiary after toxicology reports reflected the presence of methamphetamine in Ney's blood when he was killed in a car accident. Respondent Hutchinson, Ney's daughter and beneficiary, sued Appellant for insurance benefits, arguing that the policy exclusion for injury resulting from an insured being "under the influence of any narcotic" did not apply to Ney's claim, because methamphetamine isn't a narcotic. The circuit court granted Respondent summary judgment on the ground that methamphetamine is not a narcotic within the definition of the policy. In this appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit curt erred in granting summary judgment when the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "narcotic" is understood by laypersons, and that he operative language of the policy, "under the influence of any narcotic" was taken verbatim from the state insurance code. On review of the case, the Supreme Court found Appellant's argument persuasive, and reversed and remanded the case to the lower court for further consideration.

Appellants Hanson Brick America, Inc and Zurich North America appeal the circuit court's order reversing the appellate panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Respondent Lawson's knee problems were not causally related to his back injury sustained on the job, and the awarding Respondent temporary total disability benefits. Respondent, a fork lift operator, was injured while moving a bag of motor. Diagnosed with degenerative disk disease, Respondent underwent surgery and had bones fused and screws inserted in his spine. Following surgery, Respondent still suffered from back pain; several months later, he developed pain in both knees that affected his ability to walk. Respondent filed a Form 50 with the Commission to report his injuries, and seeking temporary total disability benefits. Appellants challenged Respondent's claim. The Commission's hearing officer ruled that Respondent was entitled to receive temporary total disability benefits, but that the pains in his knees were not a compensible injury. Prior to the Commission's final order, Respondent sought to have newly discovered evidence admitted for the Commission's consideration; Appellants objected, but the commissioner determined that Respondent, in addition to benefits for his back injury, should also receive compensation for his knee pain. On review of the records, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's determination that Lawson was entitled to temporary total disability benefits and further evaluation of his knees, and remand the case back to the appellate panel for reconsideration of all evidence.

Defendant-Appellant Lawrence Burgess appeals his conviction for possession of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. In his appeal, Defendant questioned the validity of a multijurisdictional narcotics enforcement agreement, the admissibility of an arresting officer's employment records, and the circumstances under which a trial judge must charge "mere presence." Defendant was arrested outside the town limits of Batesburg-Leesville by a Batesburg-Leesville officer. The officer was acting within a multijurisdictional drug enforcement unit agreement (NET agreement) signed by the Batesville-Leesville Police Department. The agreement covered all of Lexington County, which included the area outside the Batesville-Leesville town limits. Defendant alleged the officer did not have the authority to arrest him. The trial judge found the NET agreement valid, and that the officer had authority to make the arrest. Defendant then sought to have the arresting officer's employment records admitted into evidence to attempt to portray him as an "overzealous narcotics officer." The trial judge sustained the state's objection to the records' admission. Defendant also argued that none of the witnesses could testify that Defendant actually possessed the crack cocaine which was found on the ground at his arrest. The trial judge instructed the jury to consider whether Defendant had actual possession, but offered no definition of "mere presence." On review of the case, the Supreme Court found no reversible errors in the lower court's decision, and affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Appellant-Defendant Tyquan Jared Amir Jones was charged as a juvenile with murder, armed robbery and unlawful possession of a pistol. The family court waived jurisdiction and ordered Defendant be treated as an adult. Defendant plead to a lesser charge pursuant to a plea agreement. On appeal, Defendant argued the family court erred in waiving jurisdiction because it did not properly apply state law in its order, and that statements he made to police should not have been used against him because his mother was not present when he signed the waiver of rights form. The Supreme Court found that the family court properly considered all of the Kent factors in deciding to waive jurisdiction. The Court also found that Defendant never argued the statement was involuntary at trial. Finding no reversible errors, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.